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Abstract
In Pakistan, the ownership of majority of the firms is characterized
by the concentration of different groups such as family members,
associated firms, institutional investors and insiders. The present study
aims to investigate whether different ownership structure including
family ownership, associated ownership, institutional ownership,
concentrated ownership, managerial ownership, block holding, and
foreign ownership contribute to the financial performance of non-
financial firms listed at the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX). Findings
suggest that a firm’s performance increases significantly in the presence
of associated ownership, concentrated ownership, institutional
ownership and block holding. This indicates that these ownership
structures add value and help in reducing agency problems. On the
other hand, family and managerial ownership have a negative
relationship with firm performance. These findings are consistent with
the hypothesis of minority shareholder expropriation which states
that when family ownership and managers’ involvement is higher in a
firm, they exploit the funds of minor shareholders. Similarly, foreign
ownership also does not add value.
Keywords: Ownership Structure, Firm Performance, Board of Directors,
Tobin’s Q, Pakistan.
JEL Classification: Z 000
Farman Ullah Khan1 and Muhammad Nouman2
1,2- Institute of Business and Management Science (IBMS), The University of
Agriculture Peshawar, Pakistan
PAKISTAN BUSINESS REVIEW APRIL 2017
Research
2
Does Ownership Structure
Introduction
Recently, firm performance has gained critical attention due
to the dynamic business environment (Abdullah, Shah, Gohar, &
Iqbal, 2011). There are many factors that lead the firm’s performance
positively. The performance of firms mostly depends upon the
strategic decisions carefully designed and taken by the business
owner of the organization. Due to the tough competition in the market,
a firm gives equal importance to the list of vital factors including the
management roles, corporate governance, ownership structure and
the board of directors etc. The ownership structure is one of important
factor that affects the firm’s performance (Alipour, 2013).
Corporate ownership structures encourage firms to create
value in industry in terms of advanced innovations, technology and
skilled workforce development and to devise control system
(Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Researchers have given more attention to
the managers and shareholders’ interests in the firm ownership
structure. These researchers examined the relationship between firm’s
performance and ownership structure keeping in mind the conflict of
interests among the principals and agents (owners and managers) of
the firm which were first proposed by Adam Smith and then further
studied by Berle and Means (1932), and Jensen and Meckling (1976).
This proposed concept known as agency theory, depends upon the
diverse interest, the asymmetry information and conflict among the
principal and agent in an organization. Jensen and Meckling (1983)
highlighted that agency problems can be reduced if managers posses
significant stake of shares, and as a result work for the interest of
shareholders in the organization. On the other hand, Fama and Jensen
(1983), Demsetz (1983), Shliefer and Vishney (1997), and Schulze,
Lubatkin, Dino, and Buchholtz (2001) reported that when managers
and investors own higher portion of shares then conflict of interest
arises because they exploit the funds of minor shareholders.
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Family control of public corporations is considered with mixed
feelings by public opinion as suggested by Abdullah et al (2011).
They stated that family firm is respected because many large size
firms have prospered under control of family for long period of time.
Family owned firms can better perform than the non-family firms for
two main reasons. First, family owned firms make better investment
decisions as compared to non family owned firms because families
have more firm specific knowledge (Stein, 1989). Second, family
ownership is in a better position to mitigate the agency problem, as
family ownership aligns the incentives of the shareholders and
managers in a better way (Fama and Jensen, 1983). On the other hand,
different researchers have also highlighted the reasons for negative
impact of high concentration of ownership on a firm’s performance.
First, that owners having large stake of investment may have different
priorities. This is seen as a potential for conflicts of interest with
outside shareholders and thus can destroy value of firms. Family
mangers are clearly oriented to maintain control on companies they
found or acquire, and often apply control-enhancing devices that
have proven to be related with lower value-creation (Claessens,
Djankov, Fan, & Lang, 2002; Lins, 2003; Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick,
2004). Second, family firms adopt more conservative approach and
relinquish profitable investment opportunities (Morck, Strangeland,
& Yeung, 2000). Third, family owned firms are also criticized for hiring
unqualified family members on key positions, (Kellermanns and
Eddleston, 2004; Martínez et al., 2007).
Similarly, other types of ownership structures including
associated ownership, institutional ownership, managerial ownership
and block holders also deal effectively with agency problems in a firm,
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Tarziján (1999) highlighted that each type
of group ownership may reduce different transaction costs related to
labor and materials etc. that give mechanism for avoiding different
sorts of market failures. However, such owners are also not free of
cost because of internal conflicts among shareholders. La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Robert (2000) determined that investors having
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dominancy and holding key roles in management exploit minor
shareholders in a firm. They described different ways of expropriation
including committing earning management, selling assets at
unreasonable prices to concerned parties, and assigning key position
to unqualified group members in an organization etc. La Porta et al.
(2000) further explained that such kind of expropriations bring
inefficiency in an organization’s management and financial system.
In Pakistan, majority of the business are owned by the
concentration of one or other groups such as managers, directors,
institutional investors and block holders etc, therefore this area needs
attention (Javid & Iqbal; 2008, Din & Javid, 2012). In Pakistan a limited
number of studies have focused on the impact of different ownership
structures on firm performance. Few of these studies have considered
a single type of ownership structure for example Abbas, Naqvi and
Mirza (2013) considered concentrated ownership, khan and khan
(2011) and Din and Javid (2012) considered family ownership, Shah,
Butt, and Saeed (2011) considered director ownership, while
managerial ownership was considered by Haris and Javid (2014) and
Khan, Ullah, and Shah (2012). On the other hand, few studies have
considered more than one ownership structures (See for example
Abdullah et al., 2011; Javid & Iqbal; 2008). The present study adds to
the extant literature by examining the effect of several ownership
structures including family ownership, associated ownership,
concentrated ownership, institutional ownership, managerial
ownership, block holding, and foreign ownership on the performance
of non-financial Pakistani firms over the time span 2004 to 2013.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follow: Section 2 provides
review of the extant literature. Section 3 demonstrates methodology
of the study. Empirical results are discussed in section 4.  Section 5
provides conclusion of the study. Section 6 highlights limitations of
the study and future directions.
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Literature Review
Ownership structure and its impact on firm performance has
remained a source of great interest for the financial scientists. Research
on ownership was initially started from the agency theory of Adam
Smith (1776) that provide base to the firm’s financial health through
avoiding conflict among principle and agent. Barley and Means (1932)
further studied the agency theory and their relationship with ownership
and shareholder’s interest. They argued that high interest in
corporation is correlated with high ownership and there is positive
relationship between high ownership and firm performance. Similarly
Jensen and Meckling (1976) came up with the agency theory and
explored that high managerial ownership can reduce agency costs
through aligning manger and shareholder’s interest. Later on, Fama
and Jensen (1983), Shelifer and Vishney (1986), and Morck, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1988) studied the principle-agent problem and their
relationship with ownership structure. They suggest that the principle-
agent conflicts may be resolved by handling the management activities
efficiently on the part of larger ownership.
In extension to the literature, different authors highlighted
mixed feelings about family ownership (see for example, Burkart,
Panunzi, & Shleifer, 2003; Maury, 2005; Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Shahab
& Javid, 2011). Due to family ownership the conflicts of interest
between the owners and managers are alleviated (Berle & means, 1932)
and agency costs are reduced (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Family
evolvement in businesses also encourages long term perspective
(Anderson & Reeb, 2003). Finally, family management leads in to
competitive advantage (Burkart et al., 2003).
Contrarily, different research papers highlight the negative
linkages between family ownership and their impact on firm
performance. For example, Gomez-Mejia, Tosi, and Hinkin (1987); and
Donckels and Froehlich (1991) came up with negative results. They
found that family owned firms adopt much conservative approach,
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less innovative, less active and less development oriented strategies
in comparison to non family firms. Lansberg, Perrow, and Rogolsky
(1988) investigated that these firms mostly practiced nepotism and
thus family firms hire unprofessional managers.
In addition, agency problem of second type arises in family
firms because family managers exploit the funds of small shareholders
for private benefits, (Villalonga & Amit, 2006). The studies of
Bennedsen, Nielsen, Pérez-González, and Wolfenzon (2006), Sciascia
and Mazzola (2008), and Khan and Khan (2011) also support the
previous studies and preferred non family firms. Their results suggest
that family ownership negatively influenced the firm’s performance
because of lack of general professional competencies of family owners
and due to conflicts of family managers on non-financial goals.
The above literature shows that previous researchers came
up with mixed results. Therefore, our expectation regarding the
direction of relationship between family ownership and firm’s
performance is ambiguous.
Based on the above discussion and empirical evidence, the following
hypothesis can be examined:
Hypothesis 1: There is a significant relationship between family
ownership and firm performance.
Agency theory presents that a firm’s value is generated if
the group of owners have significant fraction of investment in an
organization as suggested by Barley and Means (1932). The interest
of managers and shareholders will be aligned due to the presence of
group owners in a firm which control the unfavorable activities of
internal management (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). Group owned firms
can also compete in competitive environment and these firms help
one another through shared heterogeneous resources like advanced
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technology, finance and experience etc. as suggested by Wang (2006),
Vilalonga (2006), and ThesmarSrear (2007).
Previous researchers came up with both significant positive
and negative impact of associated ownership on firm performance.
Therefore, the following hypothesis can be formed on the basis of
previous discussions:
Hypothesis 2: There is a significant relationship between associated
ownership and firm performance.
Conflicts that arise as a result of principal-agent relations
can best be solved by ownership structure (Shleifer and Vishny (1997).
On other hand it is also argued that shareholders having more shares
in ownership can dishonor the rights of those having less number of
shares by giving precedence to their own shares and their individual
interest over other’s interest (Aren, Özkan, and Dinç, 2014). In their
study on ownership structure and control La Porta et al (1999) reported
that only those firms that are family concentrated or publically owned
can safeguard the interest of stockholders of a firm. In their study
they also concluded that firms having control and rights of institutional
investors were very rare. Another study by La Porta et al. (1998) in the
context of Turkish firms where shareholders were not safe also revealed
the same result. Ownership concentration was found on a peak in
turkey and firms were mostly family owned that time (Demirag and
Serter, 2003). Hill and Snell (1988) explained in their study that
ownership concentration under the group of ownership structure can
affect the performance of a firm which can in turn lead to shareholders
wealth maximization. They also demonstrated that a direct positive
association exists between concentrated ownership and firm
performance. Based on the empirical evidence the following hypothesis
can be formed:
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Hypothesis 3: There is a significant relationship between concentrated
ownership and firm performance.
Institutional investors are financial institutions available in
financial markets to take shares in organizational ownership.
Institutional investors can generate a profound volume of stocks
return in securities exchange markets (Shah, et al. 2015). For that
reason, institutional investors are significant players in best operating
financial markets. Shliefer and Vishny (1986) in their study suggested
active monitoring proposition regarding institutional investors
according to which institutional investors have the authority to
implement such strategies on managers so that they should take
decisions that are in the best favor of these institutions. Because of
their large share in organization these institutions have the rights to
keep an eye on manager’s actions and they can alter managerial
decisions in order to avoid disruption in terms of organizational
possessions. Lev (1988) stated that single investors don’t have as
much monitoring power as institutional investors have because
institutional investors have contact with every type of financial
information regarding organization. Based on these evidences the
following hypothesis is formed:
Hypothesis 4: There is a significant relationship between institutional
ownership and firm performance.
In terms of Block holding in ownership Delgado-Garcia et al.
(2010) manifested that shareholders having majority shares of a firm’s
ownership are having more power and control and because of spiteful
management this control is professed depressingly by other
shareholders. Friend and Lang (1988) identified that for the purpose
of protecting their own funds outside block holders manipulate
managers.  Usually the financial institutions come as block holders
and compel managers to take actions and make decisions that are in
favor of their own interest (Shah, et al. 2015). Keeping this discussion
in view following hypothesis can be tested:
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Hypothesis 5: There is a significant relationship between block holding
and firm’s performance.
Similarly, managerial ownership acts as control device which
can be used to direct the internal control system of a firm, and hence
can be used as a proxy to monitor all the actions and decisions which
may in turn help in reducing and solving the agency problems (Shah,
et al. 2015). Cho (1998)  in his study regarding firm value and managerial
ownership explained that managerial share ownership is closely
interconnected with firm value because decision making is the function
of managers and they can take decisions either in favor of their own
interest or in favor of shareholder’s, which can automatically effect
the performance of firm. Therefore, the following hypothesis can be
formed:
Hypothesis 6: There is a significant relationship between managerial
ownership and firm’s performance.
Similarly, foreign ownership in a firm generates high
productivity because of their investment in productive sectors thus
they use active monitoring tools for their investment targets as
suggested by Griffith (1999) and Oulton (2000). Foreign share holders
use technical skills before applying each step in a project investment
(Chhibber & Majumdar, 1999). The following hypothesis may be tested
in this regards:
Hypothesis 7: There is a significant relationship between foreign
ownership and firm’s performance.
Methodology
Sample and Data
The population for the current study consists of all non-
financial companies listed at Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX). The
present study has used only non-financial sectors because the capital
structure and ownership structure of financial sector is quite different
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from non-financial sector (Fama et al, 1992). Purposive sampling
technique has been used for selecting sample. Those firms are included
the sample who’s annual reports and share prices data for the study
period (2004 to 2014) is available and accessible. Therefore, firms
with incomplete data or having negative equity were excluded from
the sample. Our final sample consists of 177 non-financial firms having
1,770 observations.
Data for the selected firms for ten years (2004-2013) have
been collected from secondary sources including Balance Sheet
Analysis (BSA) issued by State Bank of Pakistan, annual reports of
the selected companies, and PSX website and business recorder.
Variables of the study
Dependent variables:
Firm’s performance is dependent variable, which refers to
the profitability of the firms. The proxy used for profitability is Return
on Assets and Tobin’s Q.
Tobin’s Q is a ratio introduced by James Tobin in 1969,
hypothesizing that market value of the firm’s stock should be equal to
their total value of assets. Tobin’s Q is best proxy for measuring
market based performance of the firm (Beehr, Drexler, & Faulkner,
1997; Martinez et al., 2007; Andres, 2008; Khan & khan, 2011; Abdullah
et al. 2011). Tobin’s Q has been calculated as follows:
Where,
Total Market Value of Firm =
Market value of equity=
Return on Assets (ROA) is a ratio that measures the firm
earnings derived from firm’s investment in assets. This ratio indicates
Tobin's Q =  Total Market Value of firmTotal Assets  
No.of Shares outstanding x  Share market price  
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how efficiently company financial manager utilize each dollar invested
in firm total assets.
The present study uses ROA as a dependent variable to
measure accounting performance as used by previous studies of
McConaughy et al. (1999); Favero et al (2006); Allouche, Amann,
Jaussaud, and Kurashina (2008); Andres (2008); and Shahab and Javid
(2011). ROA has been measured as follows:
Independent variables
The present study uses different ownership variables
including: associated ownership, family ownership, institutional
ownership, managerial ownership, ownership concentration, block
holders and foreign ownership as independent variables for ownership
pattern.
Associated ownership is the percentage investment of group
companies in a firm as used by Wang (2006); Srear and Theshmar
(2007); and Abdullah et al (2011). Family ownership has been used as
dummy variable. We have assigned code 1 for those firms in which
board of directors belong from same family otherwise 0 code is assigned
as applied by previous studies (See for example Maury 2005;
Bennedsen et al 2006; Khan & Khan, 2011). The percentage of shares
held by institutions in a firm is considered as institutional ownership
as used by Shah, et al., (2015). The number of shares owned by
managers, directors and their family members is used as proxy for
managerial ownership. Ownership concentration is measured as
investment of top five share holders in a firm as used by Demsetz and
Lehn (1985) and Demsetz and Villalonga  (2001). Those individuals
who maintain larger portion of investment and have 10% voting rights
in a firm as termed as large shareholders or block holders (Abbas,
Naqvi & Mirza, 2013). Therefore, the block holder ownership has been
measured by shares held by the large shareholders having at least
Return on Assets = Net Prof itTotal Assets 
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10% voting rights. In this study foreign ownership has been measured
by considering the investment of foreign individuals or foreign
companies in host companies. Dummy variable is used for foreign
ownership were 1 represent the presence of foreign ownership and
vice versa.
Firm size, leverage and growth are used as control variables to
control the effect of other factors as applied and suggested by
previous studies (See for example Gunduz & Tatoglu, 2003; Anderson
& Reeb, 2003; Han & Naughton, 2001; Barontini & Caprio, 2005;
Abdullah et al, 2011). Firm size is calculated by taking natural log of
total asset. The percentage annual increase in assets is used as a
proxy for growth. Leverage is measured by the ratio of total debt to
total assets.
Analytical tools
We have organized our data in the form of balanced panel.
Therefore, the panel data models have been used for the analysis of
data. The model of the study in its simplest form (Pooled regression)
can be represented as follows:
Where,
The measure of performance of a firm i at time t. Since performance
of the firm has been measured using two proxies including Tobin’s
Q and Return on assets (ROA). Therefore, this model has been
estimated separately for Tobin’s Q and ROA.
Intercept of the model
 The change co-efficient for Xit variables
 the  different  independent  variables  for  performance  of  a
firm  i  at  time  t. These variables include seven ownership structure
variables including associated ownership, family ownership,
ܲ݁ݎ݂݋ݎ݉ܽ݊ܿ݁݅ݐ = ߙ + ߚ1 ݅ܺݐ+ ߝ݅ݐ                                                    ܧݍ 1 
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institutional ownership, managerial ownership, ownership
concentration, block holders and foreign ownership and three
control variables including size, growth, and leverage.
i   = the number of the firms i.e. i = 1, 2, 3, 4….N
t  = The time period i.e. t = 1, 2, 3, 4…T
We have used panel regression approaches including the
Pooled OLS, random effects and fixed effects model to estimate equation
1. The panel diagnostic test including Chow test, Breusch-Pagan test,
and Hausman test have been used to select the most appropriate
approach for the analysis purpose among the Pooled OLS, random
effects and fixed effects models.
Results and Discussions
We have used two proxies for measuring the firm performance.
Therefore separate regression models have been applied for each
proxy of firm performance including Tobin’s Q and ROA. Table 4.1
reports results of Chow test, Breusch-Pagan test, and Hausman
test for the models used for Return on Assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q.
The Chow and Breusch-Pagan tests suggest that Pooled regression
model is the most appropriate model for ROA. Thus, we have
employed Pooled OLS model for ROA. The results of Bruesh-Pagan
and Hauman tests suggest that Random Effects model is the most
appropriate model for Tobin’s Q. Therefore, we have employed
Random Effects model for Tobin’s Q.
Table: 4.2
Model selection for ROA (eq 1), and Tobin’s Q (eq 2
 
Tests 
 
Null Hypothesis (????) ROA Tobin’s Q p-value Recommended 
Model 
p-value Recommended 
Model 
Chow  Pooled OLS is more consistent 
than the Fixed Effects model. 
0.3521 Pooled OLS  0.0000 Fixed Effects 
model 
Breaush 
Pagan  
Pooled OLS is more consistent 
than the Random Effects 
model. 
0.7211 Pooled OLS 0.0000 Random Effects 
model 
Hausman Random Effects model is more 
consistent than the Fixed 
Effects model. 
0.7851 Random Effects 
model 
0.7471 Random Effects 
model 
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Table 4.2 and 4.3 report the results of Pooled OLS model and
Random Effect model which have been used for ROA and Tobin’s Q
respectively. In both tables, the negative coefficients of family
ownership indicate that family ownership influence firm’s performance
negatively. These results are consistent with the previous studies of
Shlifer and Vishney (1997), Filatochev, Lien, and Piesse (2005), Pe´rez-
Gonza  ´lez (2006), and Chang, Chrisman, Chua, and Kellermanns (2008).
Shlifer and Vishney (1997) formulate a hypothesis about negative
relationship of family ownership with firm’s performance. They
suggested that family ownership sustain large portion of shares in a
firm that may prove injurious for firm performance because family
owners exploit the funds of minor shareholders. Family owned firms
apply control enhancing devices and forgo profitable investment
that may destroy value for the firms (Claessens et al., 2002; Lins,
2003; Gompers et al., 2004).
On the other hand, the positive coefficient of associated
ownership shows that associated ownership has positive influence
on firm’s value (ROA and tobin’s Q). These results are in line with
agency theory. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argued that firm’s value
increases in case of associated ownership in a firm because group
investors control the unfavorable activities of top management. In
the presence of group ownership, firm value increases because of
long term investments by group owners (James 1999). The positive
relationship of group ownership with firm performance may be because
of good reputation of group owners as highlighted by Villalonga
(2006), Wang (2006), and Srear (2007).
Similarly, the positive and significant impact of institutional
ownership indicates that institutional investors performs well and
have greater effect on firm financial decisions because of having
significant ownership portion of institutional investors in a firm as
suggested by Shliefer and Vishny (1986); Gul, et al. (2012); and
Tornyeva, K. and Wereko, T. (2012).
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On the other hand, results indicate significant negative relationship
between managerial ownership and firm performance in both models.
Pervez-Gonzalez (1999) highlighted that family managers significantly
hurt the firm performance as they do nepotism while selecting family
member on key management positions. Li and sun (2014) came up with
different findings and suggested that an increase in managerial
ownership can cause an increase in firm performance in a non linear
form.
Table 4.2 and 4.3 report positive and significant coefficient
of ownership concentration. The empirical evidence shows that
ownership concentration is used an important tool to eliminate agency
problems among dominant and minor shareholders, (Shleifer and
Wolfenson, 2002). Because of its significant positive effect it is clear
that ownership concentration increases the firm value (Alimehmeti
and Paletta, 2012). Similarly block holding and firm performance have
significant positive relationship as consistent with the previous
studies of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Shah, et al. (2015). Jensen
and Meckling (1976) highlighted that block holders deal efficiently
with agency problem that directly leads a firm to perform effectively in
the market.
On the other hand, foreign ownership has insignificant
relationship with both Tobin’s Q and ROA. This result is contradictory
with the previous studies conducted by Griffith (1999) and Oulton
(2000); Tornyeva, K. and Wereko, T. (2012); and Javid & Iqbal (2008)
as they suggested that foreign investors enhance the firm performance.
Table 4.2:
Results of Pooled OLS model (Dependent variable ROA)
Variables Coefficient Robust Std. Error t-ratio p-value 
Constant 0.00972     0.0199       0.4861    0.6270 
Family ownership -0.0183 0.0068 -2.6662 0.0078 
Associated ownership 0.0 080 0.0038 2.0955 0.0364 
Institutional ownership 1.4 089 0.2575 5.4703 0.0000 
Managerial ownership -0.8445 0.1519 -5.5562 0.0000 
Ownership concentration 0.0 767 0.0237 3.2341 0.0013 
block holding 0.4 708 0.1271     3.7050   0.0002 
Foreign -0.0185 0.0168 -1.1041 0.2701 
Size 0.0 184 0.0045 4.0127 0.0007 
Growth 0.1 583 0.0150 10.4842 0.0000 
Leverage -0.2463 0.0132 -18.6895 0.0000 
R-squared   0.4055  Adjusted R-squared  0.4016 
F                 103.8256  P-value(F)                    0.0000 
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Table 4.3:
Results of Random Effect Model (Dependent variable: Tobin’s Q)
Variables 
 
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value 
Constant 0.0097    0.0199      0.4861    0.6270 
Family ownership -0.1797 0.0882 -2.0376 0.0419 
Associated ownership 0.1393 0.0480 2.8995 0.0039 
Inst itutional ownership 0.0234     0.0086     2.727     0.0066 
Managerial ownership -0.3829    0.1824       -2.100     0.0361 
Ownership concentration 0.0660      0.0306     2.156     0.0315 
block holding 0.0521      0.0225      2.316     0.0209 
Foreign -0.0213   0.0214      -0.9981    0.3186 
Size -0.1006 0.0606 -1.6603 0.0973 
Growth 0.5703 0.1820 3.1336 0.0018 
Leverage -0.9879 0.1719 -5.7477 0.0000 
 
Wald chi square 22.99  P-value of chi square 0 .0003 
 
The effect of control variables have also been reported in
the Table 4.2 and Table 4.3. Results suggest positive relationship of
size with ROA and negative relationship with Tobin’s Q. The positive
relationship of size is supported by the study of Khan and Khan
(2011) who reported that firms having greater size have better
performance. They stated that large firms can enjoy economies of
scale that leads the firm to perform efficiently. On the other side
negative results of size in table 4.3 support the findings of Stulz et al.
(2005). They stated that small firms create value for shareholder as
compared to larger size firms.
Growth has positive impact on firm’s performance. These
results are consistent with the findings of Abdullah et al. (2011). On
the other hand, the results of leverage in both models indicate that
there is negative association of leverage with firm’ performance as
suggested by Abdullah et al. (2011). When leverage ratio increases
then debts of the firm increases and as a result the firm has to pay
high interest which directly affects corporate value and declines
profitability.
PAKISTAN BUSINESS REVIEW APRIL 201717
Research Does Ownership Structure
Conclusion
The present study investigates the impact of ownership
structures on firm’s performance of non-financial firms listed at Pakistan
Stock Exchange during 2004 to 2013. Findings of the present study
reveal that Family ownership and managerial ownership has significant
and negative relationship with firm’s performance. These findings are
consistent with the hypothesis of minority shareholder expropriation
developed by Shleifer (1997) which states that when family ownership
and managers’ involvement will be higher in a firm then such investors
will exploit the funds of minor shareholders. On the other hand the
study found significant and positive relationship of associated
ownership, institutional ownership, and concentrated ownership and
block holders with firm’s performance. Firm’s value and profitability
increases in case of these ownership structures in a firm because
these investors control the unfavorable activities of the top
management and take favorable decisions for other minor share
holders.
Study Limitations and Future Directions
The present study has various limitations. First, our study
covers a sample of only publically listed firms. Thus, generalization of
our results to unlisted or small firms must be made with this limitation
in mind. Second, due to data availability constraints, we have
considered only non-financial firms. Future studies should also
consider financial sector. Finally, our study focuses on only the
financial performance of firms. However, the non-financial goals can
be of equal importance for managers and owners. Therefore, future
studies should take into account both financial and non-financial goals
and assess them in firms having different ownership structures.
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